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THE ROLE OF DIGNITY IN CANADIAN AND
SOUTH AFRICAN GENDER EQUALITY 
JURISPRUDENCE
This paper analyzes the use of dignity in the formation of tests for gender 
equality in the constitutional jurisprudence of Canada and South Africa. 
Recent gender equality cases in both countries are reviewed and considered 
in light of various critiques of the notion that dignity is a concept capable 
of underlying equality and determining instances of discrimination. A 
comparison between Canadian and South African commentators reveals 
many of the same concerns about a dignity-centered test for equality, concerns 
which often transcend national boundaries apply with equal force to gender 
equality cases in the other jurisdiction. While courts in both countries have 
expressed a preference for a substantive as opposed to formal approach to 
equality, and have focused on dignity in order to avoid entrenching pre-
existing disadvantage through uniform treatment, it is argued that too great 
a focus on dignity has itself obscured considerations of group disadvantage 
and contributed to the very formalism dignity was supposed to overcome. 
Equating discrimination with violations of dignity has not furthered women’s 
rights in either country, and has instead gone some way towards undermining 
them, suggesting that courts in Canada and South Africa should move away 
from dignity in formulating and applying a test for equality.   
ANDREW FOSTER†
† Andrew Foster is currently completing his LL.M (Master of Laws) in the Institute of 
Comparative Law at McGill. His studies include comparative law, international law, 
constitutional law, legal theory and property law. His Masters research deals with the use 
of international law in constitutional rights interpretation.
2008Dignity in Gender Equality Jurisprudence74
I. INTRODUCTION
A comparative review of equality and its constitutional protection scarcely 
admits of a more striking similarity than the one between Canada and South 
Africa, both in terms of statutory language and jurisprudence. Not only 
are the equality provisions themselves largely textually comparable, but 
courts in both countries have adopted a substantive approach to equality 
which strongly associates – if not equates – equality with human dignity. 
Such symmetry should not be surprising, given the strong influence the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1 and its jurisprudence, has 
had on South Africa’s Bill of Rights2 and Constitutional Court. What is 
surprising, however, is the recurring charge that neither Court is applying 
the doctrine of substantive equality with much consistency or positive 
social effect.3 One reason for this may lie, somewhat paradoxically, in the 
focus on dignity as the criterion used to define equality. That is, the use 
of dignity as a normative standard for determining violations of equality 
has itself reinforced the very formalism it was supposed to overcome. 
While associating dignity with human rights, and equality in particular, has 
had a long history, it has also come under increasing scrutiny and criticism 
as a means by which equality claims may be coherently judged. This 
paper will critically analyze the concept of dignity, to determine whether 
the analysis of equality as dignity has been given too much importance 
in recent equality jurisprudence. These criticisms will then be considered 
in the specific context of gender equality, an area for which the charge of 
inconsistency, and a return to formalism, is particularly apparent in Canada 
and South Africa. I suggest that a dignity-centred approach to equality is 
problematic for women as it shifts the focus from material disadvantage and 
1  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982 c. 11 [Charter].
2  Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, No. 108 of 1996 (to 
be distinguished from the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 
1993).
3  See, e.g., Saras Jagwanth & Christina Murray, “Ten Years of Transformation: How Has 
Gender Equality in South Africa Fared?” (2002) 14 C.J.W.L. 255; Beverley Baines, “Using 
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to Constitute Women” in Beverley Baines & Ruth 
Rubio-Marin, eds. The Gender of Constitutional Jurisprudence (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005) 48 at 72-74.
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group vulnerabilities, which were at the centre of earlier jurisprudence in 
both countries, towards greater formalism. A review of the South African 
gender equality decisions in President of the Republic of South Africa v. 
Hugo4 and S. v. Jordan5 demonstrates the problems with this dignity-centred 
approach. Furthermore, the recent Canadian gender equality decision in 
Trociuk v. British Columbia6 produced an outcome that reveals, to anyone 
interested in using substantive equality to transform gender relations, the 
perils in applying the Canadian dignity-centred equality jurisprudence.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE LAW OF EQUALITY
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opportunity for the Supreme Court of Canada to consider equality under s. 
15 of the Charter was in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia,9 a case 
which established the Court’s substantive, as opposed to formal, approach 
to equality and its emphasis on disadvantage. Andrews dealt with a British 
man who alleged that a section of the British Columbia Barristers and 
Solicitors Act10 was discriminatory on the basis that it required lawyers to 
be Canadian citizens. The Court agreed, looking at the effect of the law on 
the applicant rather than its uniform application, it held that the imposition 
of burdens on groups based on immutable personal characteristics (e.g. 
place of birth) would almost inevitably amount to discrimination.11    
4  [1997] 6 B. Const. L.R. 708 (S. Afr. Const. Ct.) (SAFLII) [Hugo]. 
5  [2002] 11 B. Const. L.R. 1117 (S. Afr. Const. Ct.) (SAFLII) [Jordan].
6  2003 SCC 34, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 835 [Trociuk].
7  S. 9 of the 1996 Constitution and s. 8 of the 1994 Interim Constitution. 
8  See D.M. Davis, “Constitutional borrowing: The influence of legal culture and local 
history in the reconstitution of comparative influence: The South African Experience” 
(2003) 1 Int’l J. Constitutional L. 181 at 186-187, 191.
9  [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 [Andrews].
10  R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 26, s. 42. 
11  Supra note 9 ¶ 37.
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The method in Andrews of looking to whether a law fosters harm was taken 
up again in R. v. Turpin,12 a case which suggested that the purpose of s. 15 
was protecting disadvantaged groups since discrimination would, in most 
cases, require that pre-existing disadvantage be established.13 In that case, 
an Ontario resident had alleged that the crime he was charged with was 
discriminatory because the option of choosing a judge over a jury was only 
available in Alberta. The Court denied the claim on the basis that those 
charged with the crime outside of Alberta do not constitute a historically 
disadvantaged or vulnerable group.14 Weatherall v. Canada (Attorney 
General)15 further reinforced the idea that equality is not synonymous with 
equal treatment, as the Court focused on the disadvantaged position of 
women compared to men and concluded that subjecting men and women 
prisoners to different frisk searches did not constitute discrimination. 
An action had been brought by a male prisoner who alleged that only 
subjecting men to cross-gender searches constituted discrimination, but 
the Court allowed for differential treatment on the grounds that historical, 
biological and sociological differences made cross-gender frisk searches on 
women more threatening. 
A similar approach was taken in the early South African equality case 
of Brink v. Kitshoff,16 where the Court chose a contextual and historical 
approach and focused on equality as a means of overcoming harm and 
social disadvantage. In Brink, a woman challenged a section of the 
South African Insolvency Act17 that treated men and women differently 
when it came to the maximum amount claimable on an insurance policy. 
The section was struck down as being a relatively clear instance of 
discrimination, though the decision is perhaps most noted for its contextual 
approach and focus on pre-existing discrimination.18   
 
12  [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296 [Turpin].
13  Ibid. ¶ 50. 
14  Ibid. ¶ 52. 
15  [1993] 2 S.C.R. 872 [Weatherall]. 
16  [1996] 6 B. Const. L.R. 752 (S. Afr. Const. Ct.) (SAFLII) [Brink]. 
17  Act 24 of 1936.
18  Jagwanth & Murray, supra note 3 at 279.
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The introduction in Canada of dignity into the analysis of equality did 
not occur until Egan v. Canada (Attorney General).19 L’Heureux-Dubé J., 
in her dissenting judgment, held that human dignity was at the heart of 
s. 15.20 The majority of the South African Constitutional Court in Hugo 
were persuaded by this dignity centred approach, quoting21 the following 
passage from L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s judgment in their own: 
Equality, as that concept is enshrined as a fundamental 
human right within s. 15 of the Charter, means nothing 
if it does not represent a commitment to recognizing 
each person’s equal worth as a human being, regardless 
of individual differences. Equality means that our society 
cannot tolerate legislative distinctions that treat certain 
people as second-class citizens, that demean them, that 
treat them as less capable for no good reason, or that 
otherwise offend fundamental human dignity.22
The majority of the Court in Hugo concluded that the purpose of the 
protection in the South African Constitution against discrimination lay 
not in avoiding discrimination against disadvantaged groups, but in the 
recognition that “all human beings will be accorded equal dignity and 
respect regardless of their membership of particular groups.”23 
L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s conception of equality as the recognition that all human 
beings are equally deserving of “concern, respect and consideration” soon 
made its way into Canadian equality jurisprudence through the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s decision in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment 













under the Canada Pension Plan25 amounted to discrimination. A young 
19  [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 [Egan].
20  Ibid. ¶ 36. 
21  Hugo, supra note 4 ¶ 41.
22  Egan, supra note 19 ¶ 36.
23  Hugo, supra note 4 ¶ 41.
24  [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 [Law]. 
25  1985, R.S.C., c. C-8, ss. 44(1)(d) [am. c. 30 (2nd Supp.), s. 13], 58(1)(a) [am. idem., 
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widow claimed that the scheme’s remittance of fewer benefits for those 
under the age of 45 violated her right to equality, but the Court failed to 
find such a violation.
Both Canada and South Africa currently employ a three-part test to 
analyze equality issues derived from Law and the Constitutional Court 
of South Africa’s decision in Harksen v. Lane No26 respectively. In both 
countries the first part deals with distinctions. The Canadian claimant 
must show that the law either draws a formal distinction with others 
on the basis of personal characteristics, or fails to consider her already 
disadvantaged position within Canadian society resulting in substantively 
differential treatment. The South African claimant must only show some 
differentiation, as a violation of s. 9(1) is established where the differentiation 
cannot be rationally connected to a government purpose. Where a rational 
connection does exist, the Court must proceed to s. 9(2) and determine 
whether the differentiation amounts to unfair discrimination.   The second 
step is to determine whether the distinction or differentiation was made 
on one of the grounds enumerated in the equality section, or a ground 
deemed by the Court to be analogous. Although dignity plays a role in the 
second part of both tests for unenumerated grounds, as discrimination 
based on sex is an enumerated ground, it is the third part of each country’s 
test that is of primary concern. 
In Law, discrimination (or “unfair discrimination” as it would be 
characterized in South African jurisprudence) is found where the differential 
treatment imposes a burden or withholds a benefit in a way that “reflects 
the stereotypical application of presumed group or personal characteristics, 
or which otherwise has the effect of perpetuating or promoting the view 
that the individual is less capable or worthy of recognition or value as a 
human being or as a member of Canadian society, equally deserving of 
concern, respect, and consideration.”27 This issue is considered in light of 
four factors: 1) pre-existing disadvantage, 2) correspondence between the 
ground of the claim and actual need, 3) the ameliorative purpose of the 
s. 26]. 
26  [1997] 11 B. Const. L.R. 1489 (S. Afr. Const. Ct.) [Harksen].
27  Supra note 24 ¶ 88. 
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law on disadvantaged persons, and 4) the nature and scope of the interest 
affected. 
In Harksen the Constitutional Court of South Africa considers similar 
factors in determining unfair discrimination: (1) past discrimination, (2) 
purpose of law, and (3) impairment of fundamental dignity. And while 
dignity is compartmentalized as one factor to consider, courts have largely 
equated unfair discrimination with the violation of fundamental human 
dignity. For example, the Constitutional Court in Hoffmann v, South 
African Airways28 noted that “dignity was impaired when a person is 
unfairly discriminated against.”29 Relevant considerations for determining 
unfair discrimination included the three stated in Harksen as well as an 
additional consideration similar to that found in Law, namely the extent 
of the affected interest. Ultimately, the Court in Hoffmann referred back 
to Hugo and concluded that “[at] the heart of the prohibition of unfair 
discrimination is the recognition that under our Constitution all human 
beings, regardless of their position in society, must be accorded equal 
dignity.”30  
These equality tests from Law and Harksen have since been applied to 
gender by both countries’ courts: in Trociuk in Canada and the cases of 
Jordan and Bhe v. Magistrate, Khayelitsha31 in South Africa. At issue 
in Trociuk was the validity of legislation allowing birth mothers not to 
acknowledge the child’s father on birth registration. The Supreme Court 
of Canada held that not allowing a father to have his particulars included 
amounted to a violation of his dignity and thus ran contrary to s. 15 of 
the Charter. The question of dignity was likewise at issue in Bhe, where 
the South African Constitutional Court held that primogeniture rules in 
customary laws of succession, which preclude women from inheriting 
from anyone intestate, were in violation of s. 9 (right to equality) and s. 10 
28  [2000] 11 B. Const. L.R. 1235 (S. Afr. Const. Ct.) (SAFLII) [Hoffmann]. 
29  Ibid. ¶ 27.
30  Ibid. See also Justice Yvonne Mokgoro, “Constitutional Claims for Gender Equality: A 
Judicial Response” (2003) 67 Alb. L. Rev. 565.
31  [2005] 1 S. Afr. L.R. 580 (S. Afr. Const. Ct.) (SAFLII) [Bhe].  
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(right to dignity).32 Finally, the Constitutional Court in Jordan considered, 
in part, the constitutionality of a provision that criminalized commercial 
prostitution but not the act of solicitation by the client. The majority in 
Jordan held that there was no gender discrimination since the language was 
couched in gender neutral terms, though the dissent took up the question 
of whether dignity was infringed in both s. 9 and s. 10.  These cases will be 
discussed more fully in due course.
III. DIGNITY AND ITS ROLE IN THE EQUALITY TEST
Recent scholarship on the relationship between dignity and human rights 
suggests that while the term dignity is itself of ancient origins, its connection 
to equality has been a matter of historical progression. One of the first 
references to the “dignity of man” or dignitas, has been attributed to Cicero, 
who used the term in two senses. While dignity referred to “rank or worth”, 
it was also universalized: dignity was said to reside in human nature and 
nature gave reason to all human beings.33 Dignity was similarly defined 
in Christian theology where it was both universal, in that all humans are 
made in the image of God, and based on rank.34 The evolution towards 
our present egalitarian conception of dignity did not occur until the 
Enlightenment, when, in response to the French Revolution and Protestant 
Reformation, hierarchy lost much of its ideological legitimacy and dignity 
became grounded exclusively in natural rights and human reason.35 This 
32  Indeed, the very fact that the South African Constitution includes a freestanding right 
to dignity brings into question why dignity should form the basis of the right of equality 
in particular. 
33  Hubert Cancik, “‘Dignity of Man’ and ‘Persona’ in Stoic Anthropology: Some Remarks 
on Cicero, De Officiis I, 105-107” in David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein, eds. The Concept 
of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2002) 19 at 
19-27.
34  Joern Eckert, “Legal Roots of Human Dignity in German Law” in  Kretzmer & Klein, 
ibid., 41 at 43-44.
35  Ibid. at 44-46.
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shift has been partly credited to Immanuel Kant,36 who proclaimed that 
man is “obligated to acknowledge … the dignity of humanity in every 
other man.”37 Human dignity is inherent in that it is an “intrinsic worth 
that belongs equally to all human beings as such, constituted by certain 
intrinsically valuable aspects of being human.”38 
This narrative of intrinsic worth is thought to have been reinforced in 
the 20th century by numerous international human rights instruments 
as a response to the horrors of National Socialism and the Holocaust.39 
And yet contemporary thinkers in this liberal tradition have themselves 
offered different conceptions of how human dignity is to be understood in 
relation to equality and treatment by the state. Charles Taylor, for example, 
views the Kantian conception of dignity and its emphasis on autonomy as 
unfortunate in that it mandates identical treatment and values individual 
rights over collective rights.40 Ronald Dworkin, by contrast, associates 
equality with equal dignity, suggesting that dignity need not mean equal 
treatment.41 Distinguishing between the right to equal treatment (an equal 
distribution of an opportunity, resource or burden) and the right to be 
treated as an equal (to be treated with the same respect and concern as 
anyone else), Dworkin asserts that the right to treatment as an equal will 
not always entail a right to equal treatment.42 It is the right to be treated 
with equal respect and concern that is fundamental for Dworkin, a view of 
dignity and equality which is reminiscent of the language of judges in both 
Canada and South Africa. 
36  Ibid. at 46.
37  Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysic of Morals, trans. by M.J. Gregor (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1964) at 132.
38  Ibid. 
39  Yehoshua Arieli, “On the Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Emergence of the 
Doctrine of the Dignity of Man and His Rights” in Kretzmer & Klein, supra note 33, 1 at 
1-3. In particular, Arieli points to the Preamble of The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UNGA Res. 217 (III), UN GAOR, 3rd Sess., Supp. No. 13, at 71, UN Doc. A/810 
(1948). 
40  Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and The Politics of Recognition: An Essay (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1992) at 37-44 and 56-58.
41  Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1977) at 226-27.  
42  Ibid. 
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The view that equality rights should be based on human dignity has met 
with a good deal of criticism from legal commentators, based in part 
on the question of whether dignity is too individualistic a term from 
which to judge equality rights. Sheilah Martin notes, for example, that 
“dignity belongs more to the realm of individual rights than to group 
based historical disadvantage,”43 suggesting that it may be ill-equipped to 
provide a substantive equality analysis. Substantive equality presupposes 
pre-existing group disadvantages that must be recognized and overcome, 
often by means of differential treatment, whereas dignity, one might argue, 
presupposes a classical liberal view of individual autonomy and agency 
antithetical to such group-based analysis. 
A related critique is offered by Albertyn and Goldblatt,44 who argue that 
the equation of equality with dignity has, in the South African context, 
caused courts to ignore group disadvantage. They note that while the first 
equality case, Brink, focused on disadvantage, there was a shift in Hugo 
whereby Goldstone J.’s description of equality as “according equal dignity 
and respect” reduced equality to dignity. This signalled a shift away from a 
group-based understanding of material disadvantage such that by the time 
equality was given a complete analysis in Harksen, disadvantage became 
only one of three criteria to consider. The replacement of disadvantage 
with dignity is said to amount to a return to a liberal and individualist 
conception of equality, individual personality being emphasized over 
issues of material systemic vulnerability. To illustrate this, Albertyn and 
Goldblatt note the decision in Harksen. While O’Regan J., writing for the 
minority, emphasized group disadvantage and vulnerability stemming 
from marriage as an institution in South Africa, Goldstone J., writing for 
the majority, was said to have lost sight of the infringement to equality as 
a result of his focus on dignity.45 
43  “Balancing Individual Rights to Equality and Social Goals” (2001) 80 Can. Bar. Rev. 299 
at 329. 
44  See Cathi Albertyn & Beth Goldblatt, “Facing the Challenge of Transformation: 
Difficulties in the Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality” (1998) 14 
S.A.J.H.R. 248. 
45  Ibid. at 258-9.
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Albertyn and Goldblatt have also suggested that the right to substantive 
equality should be given a meaning independent of the value of dignity, 
one based on the value of equality.46 This is based on the idea that equality 
can be understood as two separate concepts, as a right and a value, and 
so it is important to consider what values are to inform a right. Sophia 
Moreau makes such a distinction when she argues that the concept of 
dignity, while helpful for understanding why we value equality, cannot 
provide an answer as to the substance of equal treatment. To treat dignity 
as the test for equality is, in other words, to conflate the reason for 
valuing something with the thing itself. She illustrates this by means of an 
example from property law, noting that the value of freedom explains the 
right to property and alienation, but we would not derive a test for when 
someone has successfully alienated a piece of property by looking at the 
value of freedom. Dignity is a value, and as one underlying all Charter 
rights generally,47 it cannot be expected to be of particular assistance to 
s. 15.48 Greschner makes the same point, noting that since human dignity 
as a concept informs the entire Charter, equating equality with dignity 
would not allow one to differentiate equality rights from other Charter 
rights.49 
A different approach is taken by Anton Fagan, who tries to eliminate 
any connection between dignity and equality on the basis that the latter 
is actually devoid of substantial or moral content.50 As a comparative 
standard to be understood on the basis of either a partial infringement of 
independent constitutional rights or constitutionally grounded principles, 
 
46  Ibid. at 249.
47  Sophia Moreau, “The Promise of Law v. Canada” (2007) 57 U.T.L.J. 415.
48  The same criticism could be made in the South African context, where dignity is 
considered to be the basis of all constitutional rights. See Arthur Chaskalson, “Human 
Dignity as a Foundational Value of Our Constitutional Order” (2000) 16 S.A.J.H.R. 193. 
49  Donna Greschner, “Does Law Advance the Cause of Equality?” (2001) 27 Queen’s L.J. 
299. 
50  It should be noted that many of those opposed to a dignity-centred approach to 
equality acknowledge that some sort of normative standard is advantageous. For example, 
Greschner, ibid., proposes a focus on the belonging of individuals in communities: courts 
should draw on the history of anti-discrimination and the treatment of groups in society 
to determine whether particular groups are being treated as second-class citizens.
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equality is analytically distinct from dignity as a concept in the sense that 
the latter is not a component of the former.51 
What these views share, however, is the idea that the concept of dignity, 
whatever its value, is not analytically capable of determining what 
equality is or when it has been infringed. That is, even those who admit 
some connection between equality and dignity emphasize that dignity 
is simply too broad a value to itself be capable of making any definitive 
pronouncements on the content of equality as a right. 
There are also a number of difficulties with respect to the indeterminacy 
of the term dignity. In addition to calling the third part of the Law test 
“vague, confusing and burdensome to equality claimants,”52 Peter Hogg has 
noted several problems with the inclusion of dignity in the equality test. 
Firstly, it reverts to the idea that only unfair or unreasonable distinctions 
violate s. 15, which was rejected in Andrews, since distinctions that impair 
dignity will largely be the same as unreasonable or unfair distinctions. 
By incorporating s. 1 concerns (e.g. demonstrating a rational connection 
between the impugned law and its objective) into s. 15, the onus on the 
claimant becomes greater and courts will consequently find fewer s. 15 
violations.53 This problem has been borne out in practice, as Réaume notes 
that the vast majority of post-Law cases have used dignity to find that s. 15 
has not been violated.54 
A second concern of Hogg’s is that courts could use three of the four 
contextual factors to reintroduce the relevancy test introduced by Gonthier 
in Miron v. Trudel55 and applied by LaForest in Egan. The test, which holds 
that a law will not violate equality as long as the legislative classification is 
functionally relevant to the values underlying the legislation, is particularly 
51  Anton Fagan, “Dignity and Unfair Discrimination: A Value Misplaced and a Right 
Misunderstood” (1998) 14 S.A.J.H.R. 220. 
52  Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada: Student Edition (Toronto: Carswell, 2001) 
at 1014.
53  Ibid. at 1007-15. 
54  Denise G. Réaume, “Discrimination and Dignity” (2003) 63 La. L. Rev. 645 at 670.
55  [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418. 
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problematic in that the underlying values need not themselves be in keeping 
with equality values.56 The indeterminacy of the dignity test has also been 
noted by Greschner, who is concerned that the judicial discretion involved 
in applying the dignity standard means that discrimination will devolve to 
more of an assertion than an argument.57 Davis has made a similar charge 
in the South African context, stating that the Constitutional Court has 
rendered the value of equality meaningless by giving dignity a content and 
scope “to be used in whatever form and shape is required by the demands 
of the judicial designer.”58 The statement was made amidst a critique of 
Hugo, which Davis criticized for introducing the principle of dignity into 
the equality analysis based on a dissenting opinion in Egan, a Canadian 
decision, and without any definition of the term.       
There have also been a number of legal commentators, however, who have 
supported the close association of equality with dignity. Susie Cowen has 
insisted that dignity is better suited to inform equality than the value of 
equality itself. Given that equality is a comparative concept and dignity 
a substantive one, only the latter can provide the kind of normative 
conception of equality needed to overcome formalism.59 She also eschews 
the idea that dignity is too individualistic a term by noting that dignity 
has been foundational to international human rights, both individual 
and collectivist in nature, and informs both civil and political as well as 
economic and social rights.60 
Arthur Chaskalson has also pointed to international human rights 
documents61 as justifying the correlation between dignity, which is a 
founding value of the South African Constitution,62 and rights generally in 
South Africa. He also asserts a close link between dignity and equality on 
56  Hogg, supra note 52 at 1007-15.
57  Supra note 49 at 312-13. 
58  D.M. Davis, “Equality: The Majesty of Legoland Jurisprudence” (1999) 116 S.A.L.J. 398 
at 413.
59  Susie Cowen, “Can ‘Dignity’ Guide South Africa’s Equality Jurisprudence?” (2001) 17 
S.A.J.H.R.  34. 
60  Ibid. at 50.
61  Supra note 48 at 196.
62  See Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, supra note 2, s. 1.
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the grounds that it is required in order to overcome a purely formal meaning 
of equality that would entrench rather than dismantle past discrimination. 
Equality must include an equality of worth, says Chaskalson, and this 
requires that everyone be treated with equal respect and concern, as 
conceived by Ronald Dworkin.63
Errol Mendes likewise appeals to Dworkin to suggest that dignity 
encompasses collective rights, concluding that “[t]he fact that all human 
[sic] belong to the human collectivity gives them the inherent right to 
human dignity”. This is because “[t]he core of human dignity … is the 
ability of human kind to collectively understand compassion and collectively 
understand the need for justice to remedy unnecessary suffering”, any one 
individual not needing to be imbued with reason to possess dignity.64 
Denise Réaume makes a similar argument for collectivity, arguing that 
dignity refers to the capacity of a person to have a conception of the self 
and the capacity to conceive of the good, both of which are engaged in 
relationships with others.65 
These remarks are not persuasive enough to counteract the critiques of dignity. 
To say that the human characteristics which make up dignity are undertaken 
in groups is not particularly helpful given that many individual rights are 
undertaken with others (e.g. expression). In fact, Réaume explicitly links 
dignity with autonomy, personal fulfilment and the exercise of capacities in 
order to realize one’s dreams,66 highly individualistic language that denotes a 
classical liberal conception of agency antithetical to substantive equality and 
its focus on the treatment of disadvantaged groups. 
References to Dworkin are perhaps more fruitful, given that his conception 
of dignity offers greater nuance than the Kantian tradition and allows for 
differential treatment. That said, understanding dignity as something 
collectively attributable to humanity universally does not ipso facto entail a 
63  Supra note 48 at 202-03.
64  Errol P. Mendes, “Taking Equality into the 21st Century: Establishing the Concept of 
Equal Human Dignity” (2000) 12 N.J.C.L. 3.
65  Supra note 54 at 677. 
66  Ibid. at 673.
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consideration of historical vulnerabilities or group disadvantage. The fact 
that international human rights documents mention groups in relation 
to dignity, for example, does not say anything about how these rights 
will be conceived in practice. Article 26 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights67 has generally been read as mandating formal 
equality by the Human Rights Committee. A good example of this is the 
decision in Ballantyne v. Canada,68 where the Committee had to determine 
whether a Quebec law banning all commercial signs in English constituted 
discrimination. The Committee denied any Article 26 violation, but did so 
on very narrow reasoning. Contrary to the applicants’ position that they, 
as English speaking entrepreneurs, were put at a disadvantage relative to 
their French counterparts, the Committee insisted that the applicants were 
not discriminated against since French speakers were equally unable to 
advertise in English. The decision treated English and French speakers in 
an identical fashion rather than looking to the pre-existing disadvantages 
of French speakers in Canada or the potentially negative effect of the law 
on English businesses in Quebec. The question, therefore, is ultimately 
not whether it is analytically possible to conceive of dignity in sufficiently 
collective terms to engage in a substantive equality analysis, but whether 
such an outcome will be likely. The use of dignity by courts will need to be 
analyzed further in order to help make such a determination. 
IV. APPLICATION TO GENDER AND CASE LAW
Apart from the suggestion that dignity makes equality violations more 
difficult for the claimant to prove generally, any large-scale departure 
from a focus on group disadvantage may be particularly problematic for 
women. Such a shift increases the susceptibility of courts to slip back into 
67  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171, art. 26, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force 23 March 1976, 
accession by Canada 19 May 1976) [ICCPR].
68  U.N Doc. CCPR/C/47/D/359/1989 and 385/1989/Rev. 1 (1993).
2008Dignity in Gender Equality Jurisprudence88
a more formal analysis of equality, thereby ignoring pre-existing power 
imbalances between men and women. When context is ignored and men 
and women are treated in an identical fashion, the potential for using 
constitutional rights as a mechanism of social change and greater equality 
in women’s everyday social reality is diminished. 
This problem will be particularly acute for women where legislation seeks 
to grant women a certain privilege that men may question as an affront to 
their dignity. The focus on dignity may also be particularly problematic in 
the area of economic and social rights, as courts are often less inclined to 
equate unequal divisions of property, welfare rights, and other economic 
rights with dignity and self-worth. In South Africa, an example of this is 
Harksen, where it was held that subjecting surviving solvent spouses to 
onerous and invasive burdens not applied to others involved in the insolvent 
estate did not amount to a violation of dignity. A Canadian example is 
Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General),69 where a scheme providing only 
one-third of welfare benefits to those under 30 years of age was held not 
to be discriminatory. The dignity of young persons was not thought to 
be infringed even though the scheme created an economic situation that 
was a serious risk to the claimant’s basic subsistence. These cases reinforce 
the critique that a focus on dignity obscures the actual burdens being 
experienced, a problem that is particularly acute for women given ‘the 
feminization of poverty’. The effects of a dignity-based test have also been 
directly at play in a number of gender equality cases, including Jordan, Bhe 
and Trociuk, which will be considered in turn.     
Before considering gender cases that apply the current dignity focused 
equality analysis, it is worth discussing the decision in Hugo, a high-
water mark in the South African Constitutional Court’s focus on dignity. 
At issue was the constitutionality of a presidential act which remitted the 
prison sentences of certain mothers of children but not of fathers. Writing 
one of the decisions for the majority, Goldstone J. held that while the act 
was discriminatory, it did not violate s. 9 as unfair discrimination because 
“it cannot be said that it fundamentally impaired their rights of dignity 
69  2002 SCC 84, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 [Gosselin].
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or sense of equal worth.”70 The dissent approached dignity differently, 
Kriegler J. holding that dignity was violated on the basis of the gender 
stereotypes that the law presupposed, namely that women were primary 
caregivers. Dignity, says Kriegler, is about “seeking to protect the basic 
choices [people] make about their own identities”, and generalizations 
based on gender inequality and patriarchy “stunt the efforts of both men 
and women to form their identities freely.”71  Mokgoro J.’s dissent provided 
a similar rationale, though focusing exclusively on the infringement of 
men’s dignity. Stereotypical assumptions about men’s aptitude at child 
rearing is an infringement of their equality and dignity, Mokgoro J. 
held, as it fails to recognize the equal worth of fathers that are actively 
involved in their children’s lives and treats them as less capable parents. 
The only written decision not to appeal to dignity was that of O’Regan 
J., who, writing a concurring majority opinion, agreed with Goldstone J. 
on the outcome but provided divergent reasons as to why equality had 
not been violated. Noting that gender stereotypes do not themselves make 
discrimination unfair, O’Regan J. held that unfairness requires looking at 
the group being discriminated against and the effect of the discrimination: 
the more vulnerable the group and the more invasive the discrimination, 
the more likely it is that it will be unfair. The discriminatory harm here 
was neither severe nor to a traditionally disadvantaged group, so no unfair 
discrimination was thought to exist.72  
The Hugo decision is odd in that while it emphasizes a strong connection 
between equality and dignity, the case could have been decided entirely 
without it. Indeed, it would have simplified matters immensely, given 
that although five separate and largely divergent decisions were given, 
O’Regan J.’s decision did not appeal to dignity yet still found that s. 9 had 
not been violated. O’Regan J.’s focus on the harm and disadvantage of the 
complainant group achieved the same end as the majority generally, which 
was to allow differential treatment between men and women in instances 
where a positive benefit is provided to women and, at the same time, men 
are not unduly harmed. By contrast, both the majority decision written by 
70  Hugo, supra note 4 ¶ 47. 
71  Ibid. ¶ 80. 
72  Ibid. ¶ 112-15. 
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Goldstone J. and the minority decision by Kriegler J. focus on dignity, but 
there is disagreement as to whether the law infringed the complainants’ 
dignity. Kriegler J. tied dignity to choices about individual identity, while 
Goldstone J. simply asserted that human dignity was not infringed at all. 
This emphasizes the vagueness and indeterminacy of the term: it can be 
used to come to any number of conclusions, as was noted by Davis, and 
illustrates that the Court lacks any unified conception of what dignity 
means. The decision reached in Hugo was positive for women in that it 
granted a privilege that likely would have been withheld had the state been 
forced to provide it to everyone. However, the focus on dignity by the South 
African Constitutional Court remained problematic in that it minimized 
any analysis of actual disadvantage, an issue which became more apparent 
for women in the Jordan decision. 
The majority decision in Jordan, written by Ngcobo J., concluded that a law 
criminalizing sex workers but not their clients did not constitute gender 
discrimination since it applied to “any person” and was thus facially gender 
neutral.73 Ngcobo J. also held that there was no indirect discrimination on 
the grounds that there is a qualitative difference between prostitutes and 
clients: the former are in the business of prostitution whereas the latter 
may not be repeat offenders. Since the purpose of the law is to outlaw 
commercial sex, it made sense to target prostitutes.74 Conversely, the 
dissenting judgment written by O’Regan J. and Sachs J. held that the law 
caused indirect discrimination, the effect of the law being to discriminate 
against women since the vast majority of prostitutes are female and the 
vast majority of clients are male. As the law reinforced stereotypes and 
assumptions about gender behaviour that had the “potential to impair 
the fundamental human dignity and personhood of women,”75 the 
discrimination was also held to be unfair and thus a violation of s. 9. 
Going through the three factors from Harksen, the dissent concluded 
that unfair discrimination had been made out since women prostitutes 
are a vulnerable group that are negatively impacted by stereotypes and 
criminalization. However, when it came to the right to dignity under s. 10, 
73  Jordan, supra note 5 ¶ 9.
74  Ibid. ¶ 10.
75  Ibid. ¶ 65. 
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O’Regan and Sachs J. had a very different view of dignity. Here the female 
prostitute was not stripped of her dignity by the law, and so s. 10 had not 
been violated, any diminishment of dignity was the result of engaging in 
prostitution itself and the commodification of the body that such work 
entails.76 
The majority decision in Jordan has been criticized for failing to apply a 
substantive equality analysis, thereby failing to properly take into account 
the reality of prostitution in South Africa.77 Treating dignity as a criterion 
when analyzing equality effectively masks group disadvantage and the actual 
burdens felt. Such a critique helps to account for the failure of the Court to 
fully consider issues of social disadvantage in the context of prostitution. 
For the majority to suggest that there is no indirect discrimination is, firstly, 
to ignore the social reality of women as a disadvantaged group who are 
disproportionately affected by the law. Secondly, it is to fall into an analysis 
like the validity test from Egan that Hogg warns us about, a mistake which 
occurs when a Court decides to read the contextual factors associated with 
dignity in a in a manner that counters the equality claim. Here the Court 
dismissed the claim to indirect discrimination by pointing to the objective 
of the legislation (outlawing commercial sex), forgetting that legislation 
can serve a rational purpose and still amount to unfair discrimination.78 
Yet, the minority’s discussion of dignity is even more troubling. It is, first 
of all, inconsistent, in that it applies dignity to contrary ends. Whereas the 
law violated dignity through gender stereotyping, the right to dignity is 
thought not to have been violated since it is the individual choice of women 
to engage in prostitution that violates their dignity, not the system that in 
some circumstances severely limits women’s capacity to make any other 
choice. This equivocation suggests that the content or meaning of dignity 
is unclear and susceptible to much political and normative manipulation. 
Secondly, the analysis uses an understanding of agency that subverts the 
claims of marginalized women while at the same time undermining the 
76  Ibid. ¶ 74.
77  Jagwanth & Murray, supra note 3.
78  Denise Meyerson, “Does the Constitutional Court of South Africa take rights seriously?: 
The Case of S v Jordan” (2004) Acta Juridica 138 at 146. 
2008Dignity in Gender Equality Jurisprudence92
very human rights tradition that dignity is said to inform. Meyerson 
explains this by appealing to Dworkin’s understanding of what it means to 
treat all individuals as being worthy of the same respect and concern in the 
context of the state power to criminalize conduct. For Dworkin, violating 
dignity is a matter of treating groups as less than full members of the human 
community by translating external preferences into the law rather than 
focusing on general public ends. Focusing on criminalizing prostitution 
over solicitation constitutes just such a preference for Meyerson, who 
concludes that the minority judgment in Jordan does not apply dignity in 
keeping with Dworkin’s conception. The larger problem, however, is that 
the Constitutional Court has applied Dworkin’s conception of dignity in 
the past,79 suggesting that dignity is being applied selectively and contrary 
to women’s interests.80   
Moving to the Canadian context, the first post-Law decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada on gender equality was Trociuk, which, as 
noted, unanimously held that legislation allowing birth mothers not to 
acknowledge the biological father on birth registration violated s. 15. 
Applying the third part of the Law test, the Court began by holding 
that the interests affected were important. Parents have a significant 
interest in meaningfully participating in the lives of their children and 
the inclusion of one’s particulars on a birth registration is “an important 
means of participating in the life of a child.”81 Next, the Court held that 
the distinction had a strong negative effect on the dignity of fathers. While 
admitting that Law considered historical disadvantage to be “probably the 
most compelling factor favouring a conclusion that differential treatment 
imposed by legislation is truly discriminatory,”82 and that fathers did not 
constitute a historically disadvantaged group, the Court concluded that “it 
does not follow that the absence of historical disadvantage is a compelling 
factor against a finding of discrimination.”83 It is unclear how this follows 
79  See S. v. Makwanyane [1995] 6 B. Const. L.R. 665 (S. Afr. Const. Ct.) (SAFLII). In this 
case, the Constitutional Court held that the death penalty was a violation of the right to 
life as well as the right to dignity: see paras. 83-84, 144.    
80  Meyerson, supra note 78 at 149-154.
81  Trociuk, supra note 6 ¶ 16.
82  Ibid. ¶ 20, citing Law para. 63. 
83  Ibid.
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given that, while discrimination can exist absent its most compelling 
indicia, surely such an indicium in favour of discrimination would, in its 
absence, at least be a compelling indicium against discrimination. Instead, 
the Court noted that a reasonable father would perceive the legislature 
as “sending a message that a father’s relationship with his children is less 
worthy of respect than that between a mother and her children”, “a negative 
judgment of his worth as a human being.”84 Moreover, equating fathers who 
want to create a symbolic tie with their children with those who do not 
was said to create false and pejorative associations similar to stereotypes 
or prejudices. While there may be compelling reasons for permitting a 
mother not to acknowledge a father at birth, the Court did not think these 
reasons could justify the possible disadvantages that a father may face.85 
Finally, the Court considered proposed ameliorative purposes or effects 
of the legislation on more disadvantaged groups, namely women and 
children. The Court acknowledged that the legislation encourages mothers 
to report the birth, providing the certainty of non-disclosure for those 
mothers who have valid reasons for not acknowledging the father. Yet the 
Court concluded that, even where a legislative distinction serves a relevant 
ameliorative purpose, the reasonable claimant may still perceive that his 
dignity has been infringed.86 
Trociuk exemplifies many of the worries expressed by critics about the 
potential problems with dignity. While the Court goes through the various 
considerations from Law, each criterion is read explicitly through the lens 
of dignity in a way which minimizes the actual disadvantage of women 
qua mothers and the potential burdens they face. It in fact does make 
sense to treat women and men differently in the context of child birth 
since the biological mother necessarily bears a burden that the biological 
father, insofar as he is compared simply as the biological father and not as 
a potential contributor to the child’s upbringing, does not. Whereas the 
mother has a relationship with the child in virtue of the pregnancy itself, a 
biological father need not have any connection with the child apart from 
his genetic contribution. And yet the Court’s approach resembles a pure 
84  Ibid. ¶ 21.
85  Ibid. ¶ 25.
86  Ibid. ¶ 29.
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“same treatment” or formal equality analysis wherein mothers and fathers 
are decontextualized as parallel contributors of genetic material such that 
sex discrimination exists to the extent that they are treated differently.87 The 
fact that males are not a vulnerable or disadvantaged group is effectively 
ignored, while the valid reasons a mother may have for not wanting a 
father on the birth certificate are downplayed.  
The analysis in Trociuk also illustrates the malleability of “dignity”: just 
as it is by no means apparent how including a father’s name on a birth 
certificate constitutes “meaningful participation” in the child’s life, it is 
equally unclear on what basis its exclusion would amount to “a negative 
judgment of his worth as a human being”. The concept of dignity is used 
to justify an outcome that it could just as easily have opposed. That is, one 
could likewise envision the Court holding that the inclusion of information 
on a birth registration has nothing whatsoever to do with dignity, or, what 
is more, that requiring such an inclusion would infringe the dignity of 
the mother. The decision in Trociuk would have almost certainly been the 
opposite had the Court been forced to use the earlier test as outlined in 
Andrews and elucidated in Weatherall and Turpin. These latter cases allow 
differential treatment while all but ensuring that discrimination will not 
be found absent pre-existing disadvantage, respectively, and biological 
 
fathers do not constitute a vulnerable or insular minority. Given that 
the differential treatment in Trociuk would not violate equality where 
discrimination is largely equated with harming disadvantaged groups, the 
fact that s. 15 is violated under the Law test reinforces the view of Albertyn 
and Goldblatt that a dignity-focused test emphasizes individual personality 
rights at the expense of remedying group disadvantage. 
A review of these gender equality cases from Canada and South Africa 
suggests that a dignity-centred approach to equality has gone some way 
in undermining the very substantive equality that these countries’ Courts 
have championed. While Hugo applied the kind of contextual analysis 
87  William Black & Lynn Smith, “The Equality Rights” in Gérald-A. Beaudoin & Errol 
Mendes, eds., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, 4th ed. (Markham: Butterworths, 
2005) 927 at 983-984. 
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befitting substantive equality, the same result could have been reached by 
replacing dignity with the analysis provided in Turpin as male prisoners 
are not an historically disadvantaged group. Jordan constitutes a far larger 
problem for gender equality since the decision’s reliance on dignity is at 
least partly to blame for its contradictory interpretations and minimization 
of the actual conditions of women in South Africa. Yet Trociuk is arguably 
an even more problematic decision for gender equality and the goal of 
transcending formal equality. Not only did it fail to sufficiently address 
the female perspective, thereby regressing into an equal treatment view of 
equality, but it highlighted the disturbing flexibility with which the term 
dignity can be used by judges. 
It is by no means obvious how the exclusion of a name on a birth certificate 
infringes dignity, while forcing young people to live on one-third of 
subsistence wages, a consequence of the law at issue in Gosselin, does not. 
Nor is it any more obvious why the exclusion is a greater offence to dignity 
than the de facto focus on criminalizing only women in the sex trade, 
as illustrated in the Jordan decision. Given that the women’s movement 
has emphasized the need to provide clear language for rights in order to 
avoid political and judicial appropriation,88 such divergent applications of 
the term should be troubling. If Trociuk ultimately amounts to the kind 
of analysis that results from a focus on dignity, then in a country like 
South Africa, where there is likewise great interest among many in using 
substantive equality to transform gender relations, there should be some 
wariness in equating equality with dignity.  
The recent South African decision in Bhe may at first glance be viewed 
as an example of dignity being applied more favourably to women and 
substantive equality generally, though a closer look suggests that some 
qualification to that initial optimism is warranted. In that case, the 
Constitutional Court found that primogeniture rules in customary laws 
precluding women from inheriting intestate property violated equality, 
88  See, e.g., Beverley Baines & Ruth Rubio-Marin, “Introduction: Toward a Feminist 
Constitutional Agenda” in Baines & Rubio-Marin, supra note 3, 1 at 9; Horia Mosadiq, 
“The New Afghan Constitution: How Women Succeeded in Ensuring Certain Rights and 
What Challenges Remain” (2005) 3 Critical Half  28 at 30-31.
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but did so without appealing to dignity. Instead, the Court simply noted 
that the rules entrenched past patterns of disadvantage among a vulnerable 
group.89 Dignity was said to have been violated, though only in respect of 
the right to dignity under s. 10. The Court concluded that the implication 
that women were not fit to own property was an affront to dignity90 in 
addition to equality. In other words, the Court restricted its discussion of 
dignity to the s. 10 right to dignity itself, avoiding the application of dignity 
to different ends that created such inconsistency in Jordan. So while the 
decision is certainly a victory for women’s rights, it should not be taken 
as validation for the predominant view in South Africa’s jurisprudence 
to date of associating equality with dignity. Moreover, the facts in Bhe 
presented a fairly stark instance of unfair discrimination that no doubt 
would have been found regardless of whether the Court applied dignity 
to its equality analysis or not. Part of the problem with dignity is that it 
can be applied to suit any end in more difficult factual scenarios, Hugo 
being a notable example. Nonetheless, it is heartening to see the Court 
in Bhe associate dignity with issues of socio-economics in a way that was 
lacking in Harksen (to say nothing of Gosselin, in the Canadian context), 
a move which suggests that South Africa’s Constitutional Court – though 
more sympathetic to positive rights than its Canadian counterpart91 - may 
be taking substantive equality more seriously than the Supreme Court of 
Canada. 
89  Bhe, supra note 31 ¶ 91.
90  Ibid. ¶ 92.
91  See Justice Zak Yacoob, “Some perspectives on the movement towards and the struggle 
for equality in our context” (2001) Acta Juridica 1 for a discussion of the relationship 
between socio-economic rights and dignity. 
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V. CONCLUSION
A review of the jurisprudence in Canada and South Africa suggests that the 
association of equality with dignity has not been advantageous for women. 
Such a conclusion is counter-intuitive – if not downright troubling – given both 
the desire for substantive equality by proponents of dignity, and the seemingly 
positive effect that dignity, or at least an equality test which incorporates the 
concept of dignity, has had for other disadvantaged groups (homosexuals in 
Canada and blacks in South Africa).92 And yet the critiques of a dignity centred 
test for equality have proven particularly prescient to issues of gender equality, 
courts in both countries shifting from substantive to formal equality in the case 
of women. Moreover, criticisms from Canadian legal commentators appear 
equally relevant to the jurisprudence in South Africa, and vice versa. For 
example, Hogg’s critique applies to the Jordan decision just as Albertyn and 
Goldblatt’s critique applies to the Trociuk decision, suggesting that problems 
with dignity are more inherent than the result of idiosyncrasies of a few 
specific judges. Moving away from dignity may appear difficult to square with 
a commitment to substantive equality and social transformation, particularly 
for a country like South Africa, whose history of apartheid almost cries out 
for its affirmation. And yet, recent Canadian jurisprudence affirms Moreau’s 
view that while dignity can tell us why we value equality, it cannot determine 
when it has been violated, something South African Courts would do well to 
consider before looking to the Canadian perspective for guidance. 
92  To say that a dignity-centred test has provided some benefits for one social group 
or another is not necessarily to conclude that the concept of dignity is itself the ideal 
standard with which to determine discrimination. A law or legal framework may be so 
overtly discriminatory that an equality violation can and should be found even where pre-
existing disadvantage is not at the forefront of analysis. 
